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Abstract
In this paper, we study a class of linear-quadratic (LQ) mean-field games in which the
individual control process is constrained in a closed convex subset Γ of full space Rm. The
decentralized strategies and consistency condition are represented by a class of mean-field
forward-backward stochastic differential equation (MF-FBSDE) with projection operators
on Γ. The wellposedness of consistency condition system is obtained using the monotonicity
condition method. The related ǫ-Nash equilibrium property is also verified.
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tion (MF-FBSDE), Linear-quadratic constrained control, Projection, Monotonic condition.
AMS Subject Classification: 60H10, 60H30, 91A10, 91A25, 93E20
1 Introduction
Our starting point comes from the recently well-studied mean-field games (MFGs) for large-
population system. The large-population system arises naturally in various fields such as eco-
nomics, engineering, social science and operational research, etc. The most salient feature of
large-population system is the existence of a large number of individually negligible agents (or
players) which are interrelated in their dynamics and (or) cost functionals via the state-average
(in linear case) or more generally, the generated empirical measure over the whole population
(in nonlinear case). Because of this highly complicated coupling feature, it is intractable for a
given agent to employ the centralized optimization strategies based on the information of all
its peers in large-population system. Actually, this will bring considerably high computational
complexity in a large-scale manner. Alternatively, one reasonable and practical direction is to
investigate the related decentralized strategies based on local information only. By local infor-
mation, we mean that the related strategies should be designed upon the individual state (or,
random noise) of given agent together with some mass-effect quantities which can be computed
in off-line manner.
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Along this research direction, one efficient and tractable methodology leading to decentralized
strategies is the MFGs which generally lead to a coupled system of HJB equation and Fokker-
Planck (FP) equation in nonlinear case. In principle, the procedure of MFGs consists of the
following four main steps (see [13], [1], [10], [11], [4], [17], etc): in Step 1, it is necessary to
analyze the asymptotic behavior of state-average when the agent number N tends to infinity and
introduce the related state-average limiting term. Of course, this limiting term is undetermined
at this moment, thus it should be treated as some exogenous “frozen” term; Step 2 turns to study
the related limiting optimization problem (which is also called auxiliary or tracking problem) by
adopting the state-average instead of its frozen limit term. The initial high-coupled optimization
problems of all agents are thus decoupled and only parameterized by this generic frozen limit.
The related decentralized optimal strategy can be analyzed using standard control techniques
such as dynamic programming principle (DPP) or stochastic maximum principle (SMP) (see e.g.,
[19]). As a result, some HJB equation (due to DPP) or Hamiltonian system (due to SMP) will
be obtained to characterize this decentralized optimality; Step 3 aims to determine the frozen
state-average limit by some consistency condition: when applying the optimal decentralized
strategies derived in Step 2, the state-average limit should be reproduced as the agents number
tends to infinity. Accordingly, some fixed-point analysis should be applied here and some FP
equation will be introduced and coupled with the HJB equation in Step 2. As the necessary
verification, Step 4 will show that the derived decentralized strategies should possess the ǫ-Nash
equilibrium properties. A comprehensive survey of MFG can be found in [3].
For further analysis of MFGs, the interested readers may refer to [6] for a survey of mean-field
games focusing on the partial differential equation aspect and related real applications; [1] for
more recent MFG studies and the related mean-field type control; [4] for the probabilistic analysis
of a large class of stochastic differential games for which the interaction between the players is
of mean-field type; [5] for the mean-field game where considerable interrelated banks share the
system risk and common noise; [16] for a class of risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential
games; [12] for MFGs with nonlinear diffusion dynamics and their relations to McKean-Vlasov
particle system. It is remarkable that there exists a substantial literature body to the study of
MFGs in linear-quadratic (LQ) framework. Here, we mention a few of them which are more
relevant to our current work: [9] the mean-field LQ games with a major player and a large
number of minor players, [11] the mean-field LQ games with non-uniform agents through the
state-aggregation by empirical distribution, [14] the mean-field LQ mixed games with continuum-
parameterized minor players.
In this paper, we discuss the linear-quadratic (LQ) mean-field game where the individual con-
trol is constrained in a closed convex set Γ of full space: Γ ⊂ Rm. The LQ problems with control
constraint arise naturally from various practical applications. For instance, the no-shorting con-
straint in portfolio selection leads to the LQ control with positive control (Γ = Rm+ , the positive
orthant). Moreover, due to general market accessibility constraint, it is also interesting to study
the LQ control with more general closed convex cone constraint (see [7]). As a response, this
paper investigates the LQ dynamic game of large-population system with general closed convex
control constraint. Our investigation is mainly sketched as follows. First, applying the maximum
principle, the optimal decentralized response is characterized through some Hamiltonian system
with projection operator upon the constrained set Γ. Second, the consistency condition system
is connected to the well-posedness of some mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential
equation (MF-FBSDE). Next, we present some monotonicity condition of this MF-FBSDE to
obtain its uniqueness and existence. Last, the related approximate Nash equilibrium property
is also verified. We derive the MFG strategy in its open-loop manner. Consequently, the ap-
proximate Nash equilibrium property is verified under the open-loop strategies perturbation
and some estimates of forward-backward SDE are involved. In addition, all agents are set to
be statistically identical thus the limiting control problem and fixed-point arguments are given
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for a representative agent. In case the agents are heterogeneous with different parameters, the
similar procedure to MFG strategies can be proceeded via the introduction of index indicator
and empirical state-average statistics.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 formulates the LQ MFGs with
control constraint. The decentralized strategies are derived with the help of a forward-backward
SDE with projection operators. The consistency condition is also established. Section 3 verifies
the ǫ−Nash equilibrium of the decentralized strategies. Section 4 is appendix.
2 Mean-Field LQG Games with Control Constraint
Throughout this paper, we denote the k-dimensional Euclidean space by Rk with standard Eu-
clidean norm | · | and standard Euclidean inner product 〈·, ·〉. The transpose of a vector (or
matrix) x is denoted by xT . Tr(A) denotes the trace of a square matrix A. Let Rm×n be the
Hilbert space consisting of all (m× n)-matrices with the inner product 〈A,B〉 := Tr(ABT ) and
the norm |A| := 〈A,A〉 12 . Denote the set of symmetric k× k matrices with real elements by Sk.
IfM ∈ Sk is positive (semi)definite, we writeM > (≥) 0. L∞(0, T ;Rk) is the space of uniformly
bounded Rk−valued functions. If M(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sk) and M(t) > (≥) 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], we
say that M(·) is positive (semi) definite, which is denoted by M(·) > (≥) 0. L2(0, T ;Rk) is the
space of all Rk−valued functions satisfying ∫ T0 |x(t)|2dt <∞.
Consider a finite time horizon [0, T ] for fixed T > 0. We assume (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T , P ) is
a complete, filtered probability space on which a standard N -dimensional Brownian motion
{Wi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N}0≤t≤T is defined. For given filtration F = {Ft}0≤t≤T , let L2F(0, T ;Rk) denote
the space of all Ft-progressively measurable Rk-valued processes satisfying E
∫ T
0 |x(t)|2dt < ∞.
Let L2,E0
F
(0, T ;Rk) ⊂ L2
F
(0, T ;Rk) the subspace satisfying Ext ≡ 0 for x· ∈ L2,E0F (0, T ;Rk).
Now let us consider a large-population system with N weakly-coupled negligible agents
{Ai}1≤i≤N . The state xi for each Ai satisfies the following controlled linear stochastic system:
dxi(t) = [A(t)xi(t) +B(t)ui(t) + F (t)x
(N)(t) + b(t)]dt
+ [D(t)ui(t) + σ(t)]dWi(t),
xi(0) =x ∈ Rn,
(1) o1
where x(N)(·) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x
i(·) is the state-average, (A(·), B(·), F (·), b(·);D(·), σ(·)) are matrix-
valued functions with appropriate dimensions to be identify soon. For sake of presentation, we
set all agents are homogeneous or statistically symmetric with same coefficients (A,B,F, b;D,σ)
and deterministic initial states x.
Now we identify the information structure of large population system: Fi = {F it}0≤t≤T
is the natural filtration generated by {Wi(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T} and augmented by all P−null sets
in F . F = {Ft}0≤t≤T is the natural filtration generated by {Wi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 0 ≤ t ≤ T}
and augmented by all P−null sets in F . Thus, Fi is the individual decentralized information
of ith Brownian motion while F is the centralized information driven by all Brownian motion
components. Note that the heterogeneous noise Wi is specific for individual agent Ai but xi(t)
is adapted to Ft instead of F it due to the coupling state-average x(N).
The admissible control ui ∈ U cad where the admissible control set U cad is defined as
U cad := {ui(·)|ui(·) ∈ L2F(0, T ; Γ)}, 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
where Γ ⊂ Rm is a closed convex set. Typical examples of such set is Γ = Rm+ which represents
the positive control. Moreover, we can also define decentralized control as ui ∈ Ud,iad , where the
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admissible control set Ud,iad is defined as
Ud,iad := {ui(·)|ui(·) ∈ L2Fi(0, T ; Γ)}, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Note that both Ud,iad and U cad are defined in open-loop sense. Let u = (u1, · · · , ui, · · · , uN ) denote
the set of control strategies of all N agents and u−i = (u1, · · · , ui−1, ui+1, · · · , uN ) denote the
control strategies set except the ith agent Ai. Introduce the cost functional of Ai as
Ji(ui, u−i) =1
2
E
[ ∫ T
0
〈
Q(t)
(
xi(t)− x(N)(t)), xi(t)− x(N)(t)〉
+
〈
R(t)ui(t), ui(t)
〉
dt+
〈
G
(
xi(T )− x(N)(T )), xi(T )− x(N)(T )〉]. (2) original cost
We impose the following assumptions:
(H1) A(·), F (·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sn), B(·),D(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×m), b(·), σ(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn);
(H2) Q(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sn), Q(·) ≥ 0, R(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sm), R(·) > 0 and R−1(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Sm),
G ∈ Sn, G ≥ 0.
It follows that (1) admits a unique solution xi(·) ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;Rn) under admissible control ui with
(H1), (H2). Now, we formulate the large population LQG games with control constraint (CC).
Problem (CC). Find an open-loop Nash equilibrium strategies set u¯ = (u¯1, u¯2, · · · , u¯N )
satisfying
Ji(u¯i(·), u¯−i(·)) = inf
ui(·)∈Ucad
Ji(ui(·), u¯−i(·))
where u¯−i represents (u¯1, · · · , u¯i−1, u¯i+1, · · · , u¯N ), the strategies of all agents except Ai.
The study of (CC) is of heavy computational burden due to the highly-complicated coupling
structure among these agents. Alternatively, one efficient method to search the approximate
Nash equilibrium is the mean-field game theory, which bridges the “centralized” LQG games to
the limiting LQG control problems, as the number of agents tends to infinity. To this end, we
need to construct some auxiliary control problem using the frozen state-average limit. Based
on it, we can find the decentralized strategies by consistency condition. More details are given
below. Introduce the following auxiliary problem for Ai :
dxi(t) = [A(t)xi(t) +B(t)ui(t) + F (t)z(t) + b(t)]dt
+ [D(t)ui(t) + σ(t)]dWi(t),
xi(0) =x ∈ Rn,
and limiting cost functional is given by
Ji(ui) =
1
2
E
[ ∫ T
0
〈
Q(t)
(
xi(t)− z(t)), xi(t)− z(t)〉
+
〈
R(t)ui(t), ui(t)
〉
dt+
〈
G
(
xi(T )− z(T )), xi(T )− z(T )〉]. (3) limit cost
Now we formulate the following limiting stochastic optimal control (SOC) problem with control
constraint (LCC).
Problem (LCC). For the ith agent, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, find u∗i (·) ∈ Ud,iad satisfying
Ji(u
∗
i (·)) = inf
ui(·)∈Ud,iad
Ji(ui(·)).
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Then u∗i (·) is called a decentralized optimal control for Problem (LCC). Note that the cost
functional is strictly convex and coercive thus it admits a unique optimal control u∗i . Now
we apply the maximum principle method to characterize u∗i with the optimal state x
i,∗. First,
introduce the following adjoint process{
dpi = −[AT pi −Q(xi,∗ − z)]dt+ qidWi(t),
pi(T ) = −G(xi,∗(T )− z(T )).
Applying the maximum principle, the Hamiltonian function can be expressed by
H i = H i(t, pi, qi, xi, ui) =
〈
pi, Axi +Bui + Fz + b
〉
+
〈
qi,Dui + σ
〉− 1
2
〈
Q(xi − z), xi − z〉− 1
2
〈
Rui, ui
〉
.
(4) Hamiltonian function
Since Γ is a closed convex set, then maximum principle reads as the following local form〈
∂H i
∂ui
(t, pi,∗, qi,∗, xi,∗, ui,∗), u− ui,∗
〉
≤ 0, for all u ∈ Γ, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s. (5) convex maximum principle
Noticing (4), then (5) yields that〈
BT pi,∗ +DT qi,∗ −Rui,∗, u− ui,∗〉 ≤ 0, for all u ∈ Γ, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.
or equivalently (noticing R > 0),〈
R
1
2 [R−1(BT pi,∗ +DT qi,∗)− ui,∗], R 12 (u− ui,∗)
〉
≤ 0, for all u ∈ Γ, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.
(6) optimal control condition
If we take the following norm on Γ ⊂ Rm (which is equivalent to its Euclidean norm)
‖x‖2R = 〈〈x, x〉〉 :=
〈
R
1
2x,R
1
2x
〉
,
and by the well-known results of convex analysis, we obtain that (6) is equivalent to
ui,∗(t) = PΓ[R−1(t)(BT (t)pi,∗(t) +DT (t)qi,∗(t))], a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.,
where PΓ(·) is the projection mapping from Rm to its closed convex subset Γ under the norm
‖ · ‖R. For more details, see Appendix. From now on, we denote
ϕ(t, p, q) := PΓ[R
−1(t)(BT (t)p+DT (t)q)].
Then the related Hamiltonian system becomes
dxi,∗ =
[
Axi,∗ +Bϕ(pi,∗, qi,∗) + Fz + b
]
dt+
[
Dϕ(pi,∗, qi,∗) + σ
]
dWi(t),
dpi,∗ = −[AT pi,∗ −Q(xi,∗ − z)]dt+ qi,∗dWi(t),
xi,∗(0) = x, pi,∗(T ) = −G(xi,∗(T )− z(T )).
By the consistency condition, it follows that
z(·) = lim
N→+∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi,∗(·) = Exi,∗(·). (7) limit average process
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Thus, by replacing z by Exi,∗ in above, we get the following system
dxi,∗ =
[
Axi,∗ +Bϕ(pi,∗, qi,∗) + FExi,∗ + b
]
dt+
[
Dϕ(pi,∗, qi,∗) + σ
]
dWi(t),
dpi,∗ = −[AT pi,∗ −Q(xi,∗ − z)]dt+ qi,∗dWi(t),
xi,∗(0) = x, pi,∗(T ) = −G(xi,∗(T )− z(T )).
We have the following consistency condition system for generic agent (we suppress subscript
here): 
dx =
[
Ax+Bϕ(p, q) + FEx+ b
]
dt+
[
Dϕ(p, q) + σ
]
dWt,
−dp = [AT p−Q(x− Ex)]dt− qdWt,
x0 = x, pT = −G
(
xT − ExT
)
.
(8) cc
The above system is a nonlinear mean-field forward-backward SDE (MF-FBSDE) with projec-
tion operator. It characterizes the state-average limit z = Ex and MFG strategies u¯i = ϕ(p, q)
for a generic agent in the combined manner. As an important issue, we need to prove the above
consistency condition system admits a unique solution. We first present the following uniqueness
and existence result.
Theorem 2.1 Under (H1), (H2), there exists a unique adapted solution (x, p, q) ∈ L2
FW
(0, T ;Rn)×
L
2,E0
FW
(0, T ;Rn)× L2
FW
(0, T ;Rn) to system (8).
Proof (Uniqueness) Suppose that there exists two solutions: (x1, p1, q1), (x2, p2, q2) and
denote
xˆ = x1 − x2, pˆ = p1 − p2, qˆ = q1 − q2.
Then, we have 
dxˆ =
[
Axˆ+Bϕ̂(pˆ, qˆ) + FExˆ
]
dt+Dϕ̂(pˆ, qˆ)dWt,
−dpˆ = [AT pˆ−Q(xˆ− Exˆ)]dt− qˆdWt,
xˆ0 = 0, pˆT = −G
(
xˆT − ExˆT
) (9) e221
with
ϕ̂(pˆ, qˆ) := ϕ(p1, q1)− ϕ(p2, q2) := PΓ[R−1(BT p1 +DT q1)]−PΓ[R−1(BT p2 +DT q2)].
First, taking the expectation in the second equation of (9) yields Epˆ = 0. Applying Itoˆ’s formula
to
〈
pˆ, xˆ
〉
and taking expectations on both sides:
0 = E
〈
G
(
xˆT − ExˆT
)
, xˆT
〉
+ E
∫ T
0
〈
(BT pˆs +D
T qˆs), ϕ̂s(pˆ, qˆ)
〉
+
〈
xˆs, Q(xˆs − Exˆs)
〉
ds+ E
∫ T
0
〈
pˆs, FExˆs
〉
ds
≥ E
〈
G
1
2
(
xˆT − ExˆT
)
, G
1
2
(
xˆT − ExˆT
)〉
+ E
∫ T
0
〈
Q
1
2 (xˆs − Exˆs), Q
1
2 (xˆs − Exˆs)
〉
ds.
Thus, we have, G
(
xˆT − ExˆT
)
= 0 and Q
(
xˆ − Exˆ) = 0 which implies pˆs ≡ 0, qˆs ≡ 0. Next, we
have ϕ̂s(pˆ, qˆ) ≡ 0 which further implies Exˆs ≡ 0, hence xˆs ≡ 0. Hence the uniqueness follows.
(Existence) Consider a family of parameterized FBSDE as follows:
dxα =
[
αB(x, pα, qα,Exα) + φ
]
dt+
[
αΞ(x, pα, qα,Exα) + ψ
]
dWt,
−dpα = [αF(xα, pα,Exα) + γ − Eγ]dt− qαdWt,
xα0 = x, p
α
T = −αG
(
xαT − ExαT
)
+ ξ − Eξ.
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with 
B := Ax+Bϕ(p, q) + F1Ex+ b,
Ξ := Dϕ(p, q) + σ,
F := AT p−Q(x− Ex).
Here (φ,ψ, γ) are given process in L2
FW
(0, T ;Rn) × L2
FW
(0, T ;Rn) × L2
FW
(0, T ;Rn), and ξ is a
R
n-valued square integrable random variable which is FWT -measurable. When α = 0, we have a
decoupled FBSDE whose solvability is trivial:
dx = φdt+ ψdWt,
−dp = (γ − Eγ)dt− qdWt,
x0 = x, pT = ξ − Eξ.
Denote M(0, T ) = L2
FW
(0, T ;Rn) × L2,E0
FW
(0, T ;Rn) × L2
FW
(0, T ;Rn). Now introduce a mapping
Iα0 : (x, p, q) ∈ M(0, T ) −→ (X,P,Q) ∈M(0, T ) via the following FBSDE:
dXt =
[
α0B(Xt, Pt, Qt,EXt) + δB(xt, pt, qt,Ext) + φt
]
dt
+
[
α0Ξ(Xt, Pt, Qt) + δΞ(xt, pt, qt) + ψt
]
dWt,
−dPt =
[
α0F(Xt, Pt, Qt,EXt) + γt − Eγ + δF(xt, pt, qt,Ext)
]
dt−QtdWt,
X0 = x, PT = −α0G
(
XT − EXT
)− δG(xT − ExT ) + ξ − Eξ.
Considering Iα0 : (x, p, q) −→ (X,P,Q) and Iα0 : (x′, p′, q′) −→ (X ′, P ′, Q′) and
(X̂, P̂ , Q̂) = (X −X ′, P − P ′, Q−Q′)
dX̂t =
[
α0B̂(X̂t, P̂t, Q̂t,EX̂t) + δB̂(xˆt, pˆt, qˆt,Exˆt)
]
dt
+
[
α0Ξ̂(X̂t, P̂t, Q̂t) + δΞ̂(xˆt, pˆt, qˆt)
]
dWt,
−dP̂t =
[
α0F̂(X̂t, P̂t, Q̂t,EX̂t) + δ(F̂(xˆt, pˆt, qˆt,Exˆt)
]
dt− Q̂tdWt,
X̂0 = 0, P̂T = −α0G
(
X̂T − EX̂T
)− δG(xˆT − ExˆT ),
with 
B̂ := B(Xt, Pt, Qt,EXt)−B(X ′t, P ′t , Q′t,EX ′t),
Ξ̂ := Ξ(Xt, Pt, Qt,EXt)− Ξ(X ′t, P ′t , Q′t,EX ′t),
F̂ := F(Xt, Pt, Qt,EXt)− F(X ′t, P ′t , Q′t,EX ′t).
Note that EP̂t ≡ 0 because
F̂(Xt, Pt, Qt,EXt) = A
T P̂ −Q(X̂ − EX̂), and Ept ≡ 0.
Applying Itoˆ formula to
〈
P̂ , X̂
〉
and taking expectations on both sides:
E
〈
X̂T ,−α0G
(
X̂T − EX̂T
)− δG(xˆT − ExˆT )〉
= E
∫ T
0
〈
X̂s,−α0F̂(X̂s, P̂s, Q̂s,EX̂s)
〉
+
〈
X̂s,−δF̂(xˆs, pˆs, qˆs,Exˆs)
〉
+
〈
P̂s, α0B̂(X̂s, P̂s, Q̂s,EX̂s)
〉
+
〈
P̂s, δB̂(xˆs, pˆs, qˆs,Exˆs)
〉
+
〈
Q̂s, α0Ξ̂(X̂s, P̂s, Q̂s)
〉
+
〈
Q̂s, δΞ̂(xˆs, pˆs, qˆs)
〉
ds.
7
Rearranging the above terms, we have
α0E
〈
X̂T , G
(
X̂T − EX̂T
)〉
+ E
∫ T
0
α0
[〈
X̂s,−F̂(X̂s, P̂s, Q̂s,EX̂s)
〉
+
〈
P̂s, B̂(X̂s, P̂s, Q̂s,EX̂s)
〉
+
〈
Q̂s, Ξ̂(X̂s, P̂s, Q̂s)
〉]
ds
= E
∫ T
0
δ
[〈
X̂s, F̂(xˆs, pˆs, qˆs,Exˆs)
〉
+
〈
P̂s,−B̂(xˆs, pˆs, qˆs,Exˆs)
〉
+
〈
Q̂s,−Ξ̂(xˆs, pˆs, qˆs)
〉]
ds− δE
〈
X̂T , G(xˆT − ExˆT )
〉
Hence,
α0E|G
1
2 (X̂T − EX̂T )|2 + E
∫ T
0
α0|Q
1
2 (X̂s − EX̂s)|2ds
≤ α0E
〈
X̂T , G
(
X̂T − EX̂T
)〉
+ E
∫ T
0
α0
[〈
X̂s,−F̂(X̂s, P̂s, Q̂s,EX̂s)
〉
+
〈
P̂s, B̂(X̂s, P̂s, Q̂s,EX̂s)
〉
+
〈
Q̂s, Ξ̂(X̂s, P̂s, Q̂s)
〉]
ds
= E
∫ T
0
δ
[〈
X̂s, F̂(xˆs, pˆs, qˆs,Exˆs)
〉
+
〈
P̂s,−B̂(xˆs, pˆs, qˆs,Exˆs)
〉
+
〈
Q̂s,−Ξ̂(xˆs, pˆs, qˆs)
〉]
ds− δE
〈
X̂T , G(xˆT − ExˆT )
〉
≤ δC1E
∫ T
0
(|xˆs|2 + |pˆs|2 + |qˆs|2)ds + δC1Exˆ2T + δC1E
∫ T
0
(|X̂s|2 + |P̂s|2 + |Q̂s|2)ds + δC1EX̂2T .
Then, by standard estimates of BSDE:
E
∫ T
0
(
|P̂s|2 + |Q̂s|2
)
ds
≤ δC2E
∫ T
0
(|xˆs|2 + |pˆs|2 + |qˆs|2)ds+ δC2E|xˆT |2
+ C2
(
α0E|G
1
2 (X̂T − EX̂T )|2 + E
∫ T
0
α0|Q
1
2 (X̂s − EX̂s)|2ds
)
≤ δC3E
∫ T
0
(|xˆs|2 + |pˆs|2 + |qˆs|2)ds+ δC3E|xˆT |2.
Next, by the standard estimate of forward SDEs:
E
∫ T
0
|X̂s|2ds+ E|X̂T |2
≤ δC4E
∫ T
0
(|xˆs|2 + |pˆs|2 + |qˆs|2)ds + C4E
∫ T
0
(
|P̂s|2 + |Q̂s|2
)
ds
≤ δC5δ(E
∫ T
0
(|xˆs|2 + |pˆs|2 + |qˆs|2)ds + δC5E|xˆT |2
Based on the above estimates, we know the mapping I satisfying
E
∫ T
0
(
|X̂s|2 + |P̂s|2 + |Q̂s|2
)
ds+ E|X̂T |2 ≤ Kδ
(
E
∫ T
0
(|x̂s|2 + |p̂s|2 + |q̂s|2) ds+ E|x̂T |2) .
It follows the mapping is a contraction and the existence follows immediately using the arguments
presented in [8] and [15].
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3 ǫ-Nash Equilibrium for Problem (CC)
In above sections, we can characterize the decentralized strategies {u¯it, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} of Problem
(CC) through the auxiliary (LCC) and consistency condition system. For sake of presentation,
we alter the notations of consistency condition system to be (αi, βi, γi):
dαi =
[
Aαi +Bϕ(βi, γi) + FEαi + b
]
dt+
[
Dϕ(βi, γi) + σ
]
dWi(t),
dβi = −(ATβi −Q(αi − Eαi))dt+ γidWi(t),
αi(0) = x, βi(T ) = −G(αi(T )− Eαi(T )).
Now, we turn to verify the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of them. To start, we first present the definition
of ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
d1 Definition 3.1 A set of strategies u¯it ∈ U cad, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, for N agents is called to satisfy an
ǫ-Nash equilibrium with respect to costs J i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, if there exists ǫ ≥ 0 such that for any
fixed 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we have
J i(u¯it, u¯−it ) ≤ J i(uit, u¯−it ) + ǫ,
when any alternative strategy ui ∈ U cad is applied by Ai.
Remark 3.1 If ǫ = 0, then Definition 3.1 is reduced to the usual exact Nash equilibrium.
Now, we state the main result of this paper and its proof will be given later.
Nash equilibrium theorem Theorem 3.1 Under (H1)-(H2), (u¯1, u¯2, · · · , u¯N ) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of Problem (CC).
The proof of Theorem 3.1 needs several lemmas which are presented later. For agent Ai, recall
that its decentralized open-loop optimal strategy is u¯i = ϕ(β
i, γi). The decentralized state x˘it is
dx˘i =
[
Ax˘i+Bϕ(βi, γi)+Fx˘(N)+b
]
dt+
[
Dϕ(βi, γi) +σ
]
dWi(t),
dαi =
[
Aαi+Bϕ(βi, γi)+FEαi+b
]
dt+
[
Dϕ(βi, γi) +σ
]
dWi(t),
dβi = −[ATβi −Q(αi − Eαi)]dt+ γidWi(t),
x˘i(0) = αi(0) = x, βi(T ) = −G(αi(T )− Eαi(T )),
(10) decentralized state
where x˘(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x˘
i. For comparison, we prefer to write the limiting state αit once again,
dαi =
[
Aαi+Bϕ(βi, γi)+FEαi+b
]
dt+
[
Dϕ(βi, γi)+σ
]
dWi(t),
dβi = −[ATβi −Q(αi − Eαi)]dt+ γidWi(t),
αi(0) = x, βi(T ) = −G(αi(T )− Eαi(T )). (11) decentralized limiting state
Now, let us present the following lemmas.
lemma for xN Lemma 3.1 There exists a constant C0 independent of N , such that
sup
1≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˘i(t)∣∣∣2 ≤ C0.
Proof For each 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the monotonic fully coupled FBSDE
dαi =
[
Aαi+Bϕ(βi, γi)+FEαi+b
]
dt+
[
Dϕ(βi, γi)+σ
]
dWi(t),
dβi = −[ATβi −Q(αi − Eαi)]dt+ γidWi(t),
αi(0) = x, βi(T ) = −G(αi(T )− Eαi(T )),
9
has a unique solution (αi, βi, γi) ∈ L2
Fi
(0, T ;Rn)×L2
Fi
(0, T ;Rn)×L2
Fi
(0, T ;Rn). Thus, the system
of all first equation of (10), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , has also a unique solution (x˘i)i ∈ (L2
F
W1,··· ,WN
(0, T ;Rn))⊗N .
Moreover, since {Wi}Ni=1 is N -dimensional Brownian motion whose components are indepen-
dent and identically distributed, we have (αi, βi, γi), 1 ≤ i ≤ N are independent identically
distributed.
Noticing that (βi, γi) ∈ L2
Fi
(0, T ;Rn) × L2
Fi
(0, T ;Rn), with the Lipschitz property of the
projection onto convex set, it is not hard to show that ϕ(βi, γi) := PΓ
(
R−1
(
BTβi +DTγi
)) ∈
L2
Fi
(0, T ; Γ). From the above analysis and the classical estimates of FBSDEs, we have that there
exists a constant C0 independent of N which may very line by line in the following, such that
E sup
0≤t≤T
(|αi(t)|2 + |βi(t)|2) + E
∫ T
0
(|γi(t)|2 + |ϕ(βi(t), γi(t))|2)dt ≤ C0.
Then from the first equation of (10), by using Burkholder-Davis-Gundy (BDG) inequality, we
have, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
E sup
0≤s≤t
|x˘i(s)|2 ≤C0 + C0E
∫ t
0
[
|x˘i(s)|2+|x˘(N)(s)|2
]
ds
≤C0 + C0E
∫ t
0
[
|x˘i(s)|2+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|x˘i(s)|2
]
ds.
(12) ee8
Thus
E sup
0≤s≤t
N∑
i=1
|x˘i(s)|2 ≤ E
N∑
i=1
sup
0≤s≤t
|x˘i(s)|2 ≤ C0N + 2C0E
∫ t
0
[ N∑
i=1
|x˘i(s)|2
]
ds.
By Gronwall’s inequality, it is easy to obtain
E sup
0≤s≤t
N∑
i=1
|x˘i(s)|2 = O(N), for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Finally, substituting this estimate to (12) and using Gronwall’s inequality once again, we have
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˘i(t)∣∣∣2 ≤ C0, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
which completes the proof.
lemma for xN and m Lemma 3.2
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˘(N)(t)− Eαi(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
. (13) estimate for xN and m
Proof On one hand, let us add up both sides of the first equation of (10) with respect to all
1 ≤ i ≤ N and multiply 1
N
, we obtain (recall that x˘(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x˘
i)
dx˘(N) =
[
Ax˘(N)+
1
N
N∑
i=1
Bϕ(βi, γi)+Fx˘(N)+b
]
dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
Dϕ(βi, γi)+σ
]
dWi(t),
x˘(N)(0) = x.
(14) ee1
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On the other hand, by taking the expectation on both sides of the second equation of (10), it
follows from Fubini’s theorem that Eαi satisfies the following equation:{
d(Eαi) =
[
AEαi + E
(
Bϕ(βi, γi)
)
+ FEαi + b
]
dt,
Eαi(0) = x.
(15) ee2
From (14) and (15), by denoting ∆(t) := x˘(N)(t)− Eαi(t), we have
d∆ =
[
A∆+
1
N
N∑
i=1
Bϕ(βi, γi)−BEϕ(βi, γi) + F∆
]
dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
Dϕ(βi, γi) + σ
]
dWi(t),
∆(0) = 0,
and the inequality (x+ y)2 ≤ 2x2 + 2y2 yields that, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
E sup
0≤s≤t
|∆(s)|2 ≤ 2E sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ s
0
[
(A+F )∆(r)+
1
N
N∑
i=1
Bϕ(βi(r), γi(r))−BEϕ(βi(r), γi(r))
]
dr
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ 2E sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
∫ s
0
[
Dϕ(βi(r), γi(r)) + σ(r)
]
dWi(r)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
From the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and the BDG inequality, we obtain that there exists a
constant C0 independent of N (which may vary line by line) such that
E sup
0≤s≤t
|∆(t)|2 ≤ C0E
∫ t
0
[
|∆(s)|2+
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
ϕ(βi(s), γi(s))−Eϕ(βi(s), γi(s))
∣∣∣∣∣
2 ]
ds
+
C0
N2
E
(
N∑
i=1
∫ t
0
∣∣Dϕ(βi(s), γi(s)) +σ(s)∣∣2 ds).
(16) ee3
Since (βi, γi), 1 ≤ i ≤ N are independent identically distributed, for each fixed s ∈ [0, T ], let us
denote that µ(s) = Eϕ(βi(s), γi(s)) (note that µ does not depend on i), we have
E
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
ϕ(βi(s), γi(s))− µ(s)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
N2
E
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
[
ϕ(βi(s), γi(s))− µ(s)]∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
N2
E
N∑
i=1
∣∣ϕ(βi(s), γi(s))−µ(s)∣∣2
+
1
N2
E
N∑
i=1,j=1,j 6=i,
〈
ϕ(βi(s), γi(s))−µ(s), ϕ(βj(s), γj(s))−µ(s)〉 .
Since (βi, γi), 1 ≤ i ≤ N are independent, we have
1
N2
E
N∑
i=1,j=1,j 6=i,
〈
ϕ(βi(s), γi(s))−µ(s), ϕ(βj(s), γj(s))−µ(s)〉
=
1
N2
N∑
i=1,j=1,j 6=i,
〈
Eϕ(βi(s), γi(s))−µ(s),Eϕ(βj(s), γj(s))−µ(s)〉 = 0.
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Then, due to the fact that (βi, γi), 1 ≤ i ≤ N are identically distributed, we can obtain that
there exists a constant C0 independent of N such that∫ t
0
E
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
Bϕ(βi(s), γi(s))−BEϕ(βi(s), γi(s))
∣∣∣∣∣
2
ds
≤C0
∫ t
0
E
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
ϕ(βi(s), γi(s))− µ(s)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
ds =
C0
N2
∫ t
0
E
N∑
i=1
∣∣ϕ(βi(s), γi(s))−µ(s)∣∣2 ds
=
C0
N
∫ t
0
E
∣∣ϕ(βi(s), γi(s))−µ(s)∣∣2 ds = O( 1
N
)
,
where the last equality comes from the fact that ϕ(βi, γi) ∈ L2F i(0, T ; Γ).
Let us now estimate the second term of (16), using the fact that (αi, βi, γi) are identically
distributed, we have
C0
N2
E
(
N∑
i=1
∫ t
0
∣∣Dϕ(βi(s), γi(s))+σ(s)∣∣2 ds) = O( 1
N
)
.
Therefore, from the above analysis, we get from (16) that
E sup
0≤s≤t
|∆(s)|2 ≤ C0E
∫ t
0
|∆(s)|2 +O
( 1
N
)
, for any t ∈ [0, T ].
Finally, by using Gronwall’s inequality, we complete the proof.
lemma for x and xi Lemma 3.3
sup
1≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˘i(t)− αi(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
. (17) estimate for x and xi
Proof From (10) and (11), we have that
dx˘i =
[
Ax˘i+Bϕ(βi, γi)+Fx˘(N) + b
]
dt+
[
Dϕ(βi, γi)+σ
]
dWi(t),
dαi =
[
Aαi+Bϕ(βi, γi)+FEαi+b
]
dt+
[
Dϕ(βi, γi)+σ
]
dWi(t),
x˘i(0) = αi(0) = x,
(18) ee4
where (αi, βi, γi) is the unique solution to the following FBSDE:
dαi =
[
Aαi+Bϕ(βi, γi)+FEαi+b
]
dt+
[
Dϕ(βi, γi)+σ
]
dWi(t),
dβi = −[ATβi −Q(αi − Eαi)]dt+ γidWi(t),
αi(0) = x, βi(T ) = −G(αiT − EαiT ).
From (18), we have  d(x˘
i − αi) =
[
A(x˘i−αi)+F (x˘(N)−Eαi)
]
dt,
x˘i(0) − x¯i(0) = 0.
The classical estimate for the SDE yields that
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣x˘i(t)− αi(t)∣∣∣2 ≤ C0E ∫ T
0
∣∣∣x˘(N)(s)− Eαi(s)∣∣∣2 ds,
where C0 is a constant independent of N . Noticing (13) of Lemma 3.2, we obtain (17). The
proof is completed.
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first lemma for cost Lemma 3.4 For all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we have∣∣∣Ji(u¯i, u¯−i)− Ji(u¯i)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
.
Proof Recall (2), (3) and (7), we have
Ji(u¯i, u¯−i) = 1
2
E
[ ∫ T
0
〈
Q(t)
(
x˘i(t)− x˘(N)(t)), x˘i(t)− x˘(N)(t)〉
+
〈
R(t)u¯i(t), u¯i(t)
〉
dt+
〈
G
(
x˘i(T )− x˘(N)(T )), x˘i(T )− x˘(N)(T )〉]
and
Ji(u¯i) =
1
2
E
[ ∫ T
0
〈
Q(t)
(
αi(t)− Eαi(t)), αi(t)− Eαi(t)〉dt
+
〈
R(t)u¯i(t), u¯i(t)
〉
dt+
〈
G
(
αi(T )− Eαi(T )), αi(T )− Eαi(T )〉],
then
Ji(u¯i, u¯−i)− Ji(u¯i)
=
1
2
E
[∫ T
0
(〈
Q(t)
(
x˘i(t)−x˘(N)(t)), x˘i(t)−x˘(N)(t)〉−〈Q(t)(αi(t)−Eαi(t)), αi(t)−Eαi(t)〉) dt
+
〈
G
(
x˘i(T )−x˘(N)(T )), x˘i(T )−x˘(N)(T )〉−〈G(αi(T )−Eαi(T )), αi(T )−Eαi(T )〉].
(19) ee7
From
〈Q(a− b), a− b〉 − 〈Q(c− d), c − d〉
=〈Q(a− b− (c− d)), a − b− (c− d)〉+ 2〈Q(a− b− (c− d)), c − d〉,
and Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3 as well as E sup0≤t≤T
∣∣αi(t)∣∣2 ≤ C0, for some constant C0 indepen-
dent of N which may vary line by line in the following, we have∣∣∣∣E[∫ T
0
(〈
Q(t)
(
x˘i(t)−x˘(N)(t)), x˘i(t)−x˘(N)(t)〉−〈Q(t)(αi(t)−Eαi(t)), αi(t)−Eαi(t)〉) dt∣∣∣∣
≤C0
∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣x˘i(t)− x˘(N)(t)− (αi(t)− Eαi(t))∣∣∣2 dt
+ C0
∫ T
0
E
[∣∣∣x˘i(t)− x˘(N)(t)− (αi(t)− Eαi(t))∣∣∣ · ∣∣αi(t)− Eαi(t)∣∣] dt
≤C0
∫ T
0
E
∣∣x˘i(t)− αi(t)∣∣2 dt+ C0 ∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣x˘(N)(t)− Eαi(t)∣∣∣2 dt
+ C0
∫ T
0
(
E
∣∣∣x˘i(t)− x˘(N)(t)− (αi(t)− Eαi(t))∣∣∣2)12 (E ∣∣αi(t)− Eαi(t)∣∣2) 12 dt
≤C0
∫ T
0
E
∣∣x˘i(t)− αi(t)∣∣2 dt+ C0 ∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣x˘(N)(t)− Eαi(t)∣∣∣2 dt
+ C0
∫ T
0
(
E
∣∣x˘i(t)− αi(t)∣∣2 + E ∣∣∣x˘(N)(t)− Eαi(t)∣∣∣2) 12 dt
=O
(
1√
N
)
.
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With similar argument, we can show that∣∣∣∣E[〈G(x˘i(T )−x˘(N)(T )), x˘i(T )−x˘(N)(T )〉−〈G(αi(T )−Eαi(T )), αi(T )−Eαi(T )〉]∣∣∣∣ = O( 1√N
)
.
The proof is completed by noticing (19).
Our remaining analysis is to prove the control strategies set (u¯1, u¯2, . . . , u¯N ) is an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium for Problem (CC). For any fixed i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we consider the perturbation
control ui ∈ Ud,iad and we have the following state dynamics (j 6= i):
dyi =
[
Ayi +Bui + Fy
(N) + b
]
dt+ [Dui + σ] dWi(t),
dyj =
[
Ayj +Bϕ(βj , γj) + Fy(N) + b
]
dt+
[
Dϕ(βj , γj) + σ
]
dWj(t),
dαj =
[
Aαj +Bϕ(βj , γj) + FEαj + b
]
dt+
[
Dϕ(βj , γj) + σ
]
dWj(t),
dβj = −[ATβj −Q(αj − Eαj)]dt+ γjdWj(t),
yi(0) = yj(0) = αj(0) = x, βj(T ) = −G(αj(T )− Eαj(T )),
(20) ee9
where y(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 y
i. The wellposedness of above system is easily to obtain. To prove
(u¯1, u¯2, . . . , u¯N ) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, we need to show that for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
inf
ui∈U iad
Ji(ui, u¯−i) ≥ Ji(u¯i, u¯−i)− ǫ.
Then we only need to consider the perturbation ui ∈ Ud,iad such that Ji(ui, u¯−i) ≤ Ji(u¯i, u¯−i).
Thus we have
E
∫ T
0
〈Rui(t), ui(t)〉dt ≤ Ji(ui, u¯−i) ≤ Ji(u¯i, u¯−i) ≤ Ji(u¯i) +O
( 1√
N
)
,
which implies that
E
∫ T
0
|ui(t)|2dt ≤ C0, (21) boundness of control
where C0 is a constant independent of N . Then similar to Lemma 3.1, we can show that there
exists a constant C0 independent of N such that
sup
1≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
|yi(t)|2 ≤ C0. (22) boundedness of yi
Now, for the ith agent, we consider the perturbation in the Problem (LCC). We introduce
the following system of the decentralized limiting state with perturbation control (j 6= i):
dy¯i =
[
Ay¯i +Bui + FEα
i + b
]
dt+ [Dui + σ] dWi(t),
dαj =
[
Aαj +Bϕ(βj , γj) + FEαj + b
]
dt+
[
Dϕ(βj , γj) + σ
]
dWj(t),
dβj = −[ATβj −Q(αj − Eαj)]dt+ γjdWj(t),
y¯i(0) = αj(0) = x, βj(T ) = −G(αj(T )− Eαj(T )).
(23) ee10
We have the following results:
lemma 2 Lemma 3.5
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣y(N)(t)− Eαi(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
. (24) lemma 2 estimate
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Proof By (20), we get
dy(N) =
(A+ F )y(N)+ 1
N
Bui+
1
N
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Bϕ(βj , γj)+b
 dt
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σdWj(t) +
1
N
DuidWi(t)+
1
N
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Dϕ(βj , γj)dWj(t),
y(N)(0) = x.
(25) ee12
Let us denote Π := y(N) − Eαi, and recall (15) which is{
d(Eαi) =
[
AEαi + EBϕ(βi, γi) + FEαi + b
]
dt,
Eαi(0) = x,
we have 
dΠ =
[
(A+ F )Π+
1
N
Bui+
 1
N
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Bϕ(βj , γj)− EBϕ(βj , γj)
]dt
1
N
N∑
j=1
σdWj(t) +
1
N
DuidWi(t)+
1
N
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Dϕ(βj , γj)dWj(t),
Π(0) = 0.
By the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality as well as the BDG inequality, we obtain that there exists a
constant C0 independent of N which may vary line by line such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
E sup
0≤s≤t
|Π(s)|2 ≤ C0E
∫ t
0
(
|Π(s)|2+ 1
N2
|ui(s)|2
)
ds
+C0E
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ϕ(βj(s), γj(s))−Eϕ(βj(s), γj(s))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
ds
+
C0
N2
E
N∑
j=1
∫ t
0
|σ(s)|2 ds
+
C0
N2
E
∫ t
0
|ui(s)|2ds+ C0
N2
E
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
∫ t
0
|ϕ(βj(s), γj(s)|2ds.
(26) ee11
On the one hand, by denoting µ(s) := Eϕ(βj(s), γj(s)) (note that since (αj , βj , γj), 1 ≤ j ≤ N ,
j 6= i, are independent identically distributed, thus µ is independent of j), we have
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ϕ(βj(s), γj(s))− µ(s)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤2E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ϕ(βj(s), γj(s))− N − 1
N
µ(s)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ 2E
∣∣∣∣ 1N µ(s)
∣∣∣∣2
=2
(N − 1)2
N2
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ϕ(βj(s), γj(s))− µ(s)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
2
N2
E|µ(s)|2.
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Then, due to the fact that (βi, γi), 1 ≤ i ≤ N are identically distributed and ϕ(βi, γi) ∈
L2
Fi
(0, T ; Γ), similarly to Lemma 3.2 we can obtain that there exists a constant C0 indepen-
dent of N such that
∫ t
0
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ϕ(βj(s), γj(s))− Eϕ(βj(s), γj(s))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤C0(N − 1)
2
N2
∫ t
0
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ϕ(βj(s), γj(s))− µ(s)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
ds+
C0
N2
∫ t
0
E|µ(s)|2ds
=
C0(N − 1)
N2
∫ t
0
E
∣∣ϕ(βj(s), γj(s))−µ(s)∣∣2 ds+ C0
N2
∫ t
0
E|µ(s)|2ds
=O
( 1
N
)
.
In addition, due to (21) and (22), we get
C0
N2
E
∫ t
0
|ui(s)|2ds+ C0
N2
E
N∑
j=1
∫ t
0
|σ(s)|2 ds = O
( 1
N
)
.
and similarly, since (βj , γj), 1 ≤ j ≤ N , j 6= i, are identically distributed, we have
C0
N2
E
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
∫ t
0
|ϕ(βj(s), γj(s)|2ds = O
( 1
N
)
.
Therefore, from above estimates, we get from (26) that, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
E sup
0≤s≤T
|Π(s)|2 ≤ C0E
∫ t
0
|Π(s)|2ds+O
( 1
N
)
.
Finally, by using Gronwall’s inequality, we complete the proof.
lemma 3 Lemma 3.6
E sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣yit − y¯it∣∣∣2 = O( 1N ). (27) lemma 3 estimate
Proof From respectively the first equation of (20) and (23), we obtain d(y
i − y¯i) =
[
A(yi − y¯i) + F (y(N) − Eαi)
]
dt,
yi(0)− y¯i(0) = 0.
With the help of classical estimates of SDE, Gronwall’s inequality and (24) of Lemma 3.5, it is
easily to obtain (27). The proof is completed.
lemma 4 Lemma 3.7 For all 1 ≤ i ≤ N, for the perturbation control ui, we have∣∣∣Ji(ui, u¯−i)− Ji(ui)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
.
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Proof Recall (2), (3) and (7), we have
Ji(ui, u¯−i)− Ji(ui)
=
1
2
E
[ ∫ T
0
(〈
Q(t)
(
yi(t)− y(N)(t)), yi(t)− y(N)(t)〉− 〈Q(t)(y¯i(t)− Eαi(t)), y¯i(t)− Eαi(t)〉) dt
+
〈
G
(
yi(T )− y(N)(T )), yi(T )− y(N)(T )〉− 〈G(y¯i(T )− Eαi(T )), y¯i(T )− Eαi(T )〉].
Using Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.6 as well as E sup0≤t≤T
(|y¯i(t)|2 + |αi(t)|2) ≤ C0, for some
constant C0 independent of N which may vary line by line in the following, we have∣∣∣∣E[∫ T
0
(〈
Q(t)
(
yi(t)− y(N)(t)), yi(t)− y(N)(t)〉− 〈Q(t)(y¯i(t)− Eαi(t)), y¯i(t)− Eαi(t)〉) dt∣∣∣∣
≤C0
∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣yi(t)− y(N)(t)− (y¯i(t)− Eαi(t))∣∣∣2 dt
+ C0
∫ T
0
E
[∣∣∣yi(t)− y(N)(t)− (y¯i(t)− Eαi(t))∣∣∣ · ∣∣y¯i(t)− Eαi(t)∣∣] dt
≤C0
∫ T
0
E
∣∣yi(t)− y¯i(t)∣∣2 dt+ C0 ∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣y(N)(t)− Eαi(t)∣∣∣2 dt
+ C0
∫ T
0
(
E
∣∣∣yi(t)− y(N)(t)− (y¯i(t)− Eαi(t))∣∣∣2) 12 (E ∣∣y¯i(t)− Eαi(t)∣∣2) 12 dt
≤C0
∫ T
0
E
∣∣yi(t)− y¯i(t)∣∣2 dt+ C0 ∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣y(N)(t)− Eαi(t)∣∣∣2 dt
+ C0
∫ T
0
(
E
∣∣yi(t)− y¯i(t)∣∣2 + E ∣∣∣y(N)(t)− Eαi(t)∣∣∣2)12 dt
=O
(
1√
N
)
.
With similar argument, we can show that∣∣∣∣E[〈G(yi(T )− y(N)(T )), yi(T )− y(N)(T )〉− 〈G(y¯i(T )− Eαi(T )), y¯i(T )− Eαi(T )〉]∣∣∣∣
=O
(
1√
N
)
.
The proof is completed by noticing (25).
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Now, we consider the ǫ-Nash equilibrium for Ai for Problem (CC).
Combining Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.7, we have
Ji(u¯i, u¯−i) = Ji(u¯i) +O
( 1√
N
)
≤ Ji(ui) +O
( 1√
N
)
= Ji(ui, u¯−i) +O
( 1√
N
)
.
Consequently, Theorem 3.1 holds with ǫ = O( 1√
N
). 
4 Appendix
For the readers’ convenient, let us recall the following properties of projection PΓ onto a closed
convex set, see [2], Chapter 5.
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projection theorem Theorem 4.1 For a nonempty closed convex set Γ ⊂ Rm, for every x ∈ Rm, there exists a
unique x∗ ∈ Γ, such that
|x− x∗| = min
y∈Γ
|x− y| =: dist(x,Γ).
Moreover, x∗ is characterized by the property
x∗ ∈ Γ, 〈x∗ − x, x∗ − y〉 ≤ 0 ∀y ∈ Γ. (28) projection characterization
The above element x∗ is called the projection of x onto Γ and is denoted by PΓ[x].
From above theorem, it is easy to show that
Propsition 4.1 Let Γ ⊂ Rm be a nonempty closed convex set, then we have∣∣PΓ[x]−PΓ[y]∣∣2 ≤ 〈PΓ[x]−PΓ[y], x− y〉. (29) projection inequality
Proof From (28), we have 〈
PΓ[x]− x,PΓ[x]− z
〉 ≤ 0 ∀z ∈ Γ. (30) projection 1
and 〈
PΓ[y]− y,PΓ[y]− z
〉 ≤ 0 ∀z ∈ Γ. (31) projection 2
Choosing z = PΓ[y] in (30) and z = PΓ[x] in (31), then adding the corresponding inequalities,
we obtain 〈
PΓ[x]− x,PΓ[x]−PΓ[y]
〉
+
〈
PΓ[y]− y,PΓ[y]−PΓ[x]
〉 ≤ 0,
which yields obviously ∣∣PΓ[x]−PΓ[y]∣∣2 ≤ 〈PΓ[x]−PΓ[y], x− y〉.
Propsition 4.2 Let Γ ⊂ Rm be a nonempty closed convex set, then the projection PΓ does not
increase the distance, i.e. ∣∣PΓ[x]−PΓ[y]∣∣ ≤ ∣∣x− y∣∣. (32) projection lipschitz
Proof From (29), we have∣∣PΓ[x]−PΓ[y]∣∣2 ≤ 〈PΓ[x]−PΓ[y], x− y〉 ≤ |PΓ[x]−PΓ[y]| · |x− y|,
which gives directly (32).
Now let us consider Rm and the projection PΓ both with the norm ‖ · ‖R0 := 〈R
1
2
0 ·, R
1
2
0 ·〉,
from (29), we have
Propsition 4.3 Let Γ ⊂ Rm be a nonempty closed convex set, then
〈〈PΓ[x]−PΓ[y], x− y〉〉 =
〈
R
1
2
(
PΓ[x]−PΓ[y]
)
, R
1
2 (x− y)
〉
≥ 0.
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